董事会特征对研发投入强度的影响:董事任期与多重任职

The effect of board of directors on R&D intensity: board tenure and multiple directorships

R and D Management · 2017
被引 80
ABS 3

中文导读

结合代理理论与资源依赖理论,研究董事的任期和多重任职如何影响企业研发投入强度,发现董事通过经验和关系获取的资源能促进研发,但前提是董事能有效履行监督职责。

Abstract

Taking a combination between agency theory and resource dependence theory, we point out that directors' capital may have an effect on R&D strategies. A sample of both high‐tech and low‐tech industries for the period 2007–2011 is used. The results indicate that, regardless of the type of industry and the specific expertise on R&D intensive companies, board members with multiple directorships influence R&D corporate strategies. The resources acquired by directors through their experience and connections positively influence R&D intensity, but only if directors can carry out their monitoring activity adequately. This evidence implies a step forward in the understanding of the role of board of directors in corporate strategy, thus having significant implications for academics, companies and regulators, which are both theoretical and practical.

公司治理研发投入董事会代理理论资源依赖理论