Fooled by Performance Randomness: Overrewarding Luck
研究发现，在足球比赛中，球员的运气进球（如击中门柱后弹入）会过度影响教练和评估者的评价，违反了信息性原则，表明经济组织中普遍存在过度奖励运气现象。
Abstract We provide evidence of a violation of the informativeness principle whereby lucky successes are overly rewarded. We isolate a quasi-experimental situation where the success of an agent is as good as random. To do so, we use high-quality data on football (soccer) matches and select shots on goal that landed on the goal posts. Using nonscoring shots, taken from a similar location on the pitch, as counterfactuals to scoring shots, we estimate the causal effect of a lucky success (goal) on the evaluation of the player's performance. We find clear evidence that luck is overly influencing managers' decisions and evaluators' ratings. Our results suggest that this phenomenon is likely to be widespread in economic organizations.