Competing first-price and second-price auctions
研究了当风险规避的竞拍者可以自由选择进入哪个拍卖时，竞争性卖家在一级价格拍卖和二级价格拍卖之间的选择，发现卖家有主导策略选择一级价格拍卖，但在某些条件下也可能选择二级价格拍卖。
This paper theoretically investigates which auctions are selected by competing sellers when they can choose between first-price auctions and second-price auctions, and when homogeneously risk averse bidders endogenously enter one of the auctions. In order to study this, we first consider bidders’ entry decisions between exogenously given auctions. We find that there exists a symmetric entry equilibrium that is unique and is characterized by a mixed strategy, which depends on whether bidders exhibit constant, decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion. In a next step, we endogenize the sellers’ choice of auctions. We show that competing sellers have a dominant strategy to select first-price auctions if bidders exhibit nondecreasing absolute risk aversion. If bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, other equilibria may exist in which sellers select second-price auctions as well. For instance, we demonstrate that sellers may select second-price auctions if the distribution of private values is sufficiently skewed.