Note on Cournot Competition Under Yield Uncertainty
受美国流感疫苗市场启发，研究了不对称企业在面临产能约束和产量不确定性时的古诺竞争均衡，发现企业按得分阈值决定是否满产，并纠正了前人关于对称企业情形下多样化益处的分析错误。
Inspired by the U.S. influenza vaccine market, we formulate a Cournot competition model with asymmetric firms facing capacity constraints and yield uncertainty. We derive the equilibrium of this model by defining a score that ranks firms based on their capacity, unit production cost, random yield mean, and variance. In particular, we show a threshold structure. Firms that have scores above a threshold produce at full capacity, while other firms produce less than their capacities in the equilibrium. Finally, for the case of symmetric firms, we correct mistakes in the analysis of Deo and Corbett [Deo S, Corbett CJ (2009) Cournot competition under yield uncertainty: The case of the U.S. influenza vaccine market. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 11(4):563–576], showing that society can benefit from supplier diversification under weaker conditions. The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2016.0610 .