In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit
提出一个合同理论模型，说明供应商比银行更愿意放贷，因为借款人挪用实物投入比挪用现金更难获利，从而解释了贸易信贷的期限短、在欠发达信贷市场更普遍等特征。
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets, and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms.