Pricing Network Effects: Competition
研究寡头市场中企业利用消费者影响力信息进行价格歧视的做法，发现这会导致低效的消费者-产品匹配，且企业信息投资存在战略互补性，最终侵蚀福利和利润但增加消费者剩余。
We study the practice of influencer marketing in oligopoly markets and its effect on market efficiency. In our model, each consumer is influenced by choices of a subset of other consumers. Firms gather information on consumers’ influence and price discriminate using this information. In equilibrium, firms charge premia/subsidize below-/ above-average-influential consumers; the premia/discounts depend on the strength of network effects and on how much information firms have on consumers’ influence. Influencer marketing leads to inefficient consumer-product matches. Firms’ investments in information are strategic complements, leading to a race for information acquisition that erodes welfare and firms’ profits but increases consumer surplus.