Macroprudential Policy with Liquidity Panics
研究了银行间信息摩擦导致市场冻结时，宏观审慎政策的最优性，发现对银行施加流动性要求能缓解摩擦、增加总投资，而鼓励放贷的政策效果相反。
Abstract We study the optimality of macroprudential policies in an environment where banks provide liquidity to firms. Informational frictions between banks can cause interbank market freezes, prompting firms to accumulate their own liquid assets. Liquidity hoarding by firms in turn reduces the demand for bank loans and bank profitability, makes interbank market freezes even more likely, and may ultimately trigger a self-fulfilling bad equilibrium. Such “liquidity panics” provide an additional rationale for liquidity requirements on banks, which alleviate frictions in the banking sector and, paradoxically, can increase aggregate investment. Instead, policies encouraging bank lending can have the opposite effect.