A Strategic Analysis of Multi-Channel Expert Services
研究了专家服务提供商何时以及如何提供在线服务，以及是否应对面对面和在线服务分别定价。发现垄断者差别定价可能提高消费者剩余，而双寡头市场全面采用在线渠道会加剧价格竞争、降低利润。
Using stylized models, we investigate when and how expert service providers should offer their services online, and whether they should charge separate prices for face-to-face and online services or provide the online service as a free supplement. Interestingly, consumer surplus can rise when a monopolist charges different prices for face-to-face and online services, and it may drop when the monopolist starts offering the online service as a free add-on to its face-to-face service. We find that a market-wide adoption of the online channel by competing experts in a duopoly setting intensifies price competition and thereby reduces overall profits. Furthermore, the rate of adoption is highest when the online service is moderately effective, whereas one of the experts refuses to offer the service when it is highly effective. These results provide theoretical support for the viability of online expert services as well as practical guidance on pricing strategies.