Gender Equality in Mortgage Lending
基于30年固定利率次级贷款数据，用竞争风险模型发现女性借款人即使违约和提前还款概率相同，仍支付更高合同利率，揭示抵押市场存在性别不平等。
Abstract Using a sample of 30‐year fixed‐rate subprime mortgage loans, this article empirically examines whether gender inequality exists in the mortgage market, specifically whether a borrower's gender affects the loan contract rate charged, beyond the impact of the borrower's probability of default and prepayment. The results, based on a competing‐risks loan hazard model, reveal that borrowers of different genders have different loan termination patterns. After controlling for the probability of a borrower defaulting or prepaying, female borrowers pay higher contract rates in the subprime mortgage market over the study period.