The Persistence of Opportunistic Insider Trading
研究了持续盈利的内幕交易者的交易行为，发现其交易比其他人更能预测公司业绩，且这种优势在管理者、治理弱和信息不对称高的公司中更明显。
Abstract We study the drivers of persistent insider trading profitability by examining the trades of insiders whose past trades have been profitable. We find that the current transactions of these persistently profitable (PP) insiders better predict firm performance than those of other insiders. The relative abnormal performance is more pronounced for trades of insiders who are managers rather than large shareholders or unaffiliated insiders and for trades in firms with weaker governance and greater information asymmetry. The trades of PP insiders also better predict earnings surprises, major corporate news, and analyst revisions. Collectively, these results indicate that PP insider transactions provide valid signals regarding future firm performance and that persistence in profitability is driven by informational advantages.