The effect of restatements on analyst behavior
研究了财务报告重述如何影响分析师行为，发现违规导致的重述会减少分析师覆盖、降低预测准确性并增加预测分散度，而错误导致的重述仅增加预测误差。
Abstract This paper examines how changes in the credibility of financial reporting affect analyst behavior. Using a sample of restatement firms experiencing a substantial change in credibility over 1997–2006, we document that restatements have a long‐lived effect on analyst behavior and that analysts differentiate between restatements caused by irregularities and those caused by errors. We find that while irregularity restatement firms exhibit a reduction in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion in the post‐restatement period, other restatement firms exhibit only an increase in forecast error. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that remedial actions reduce the effect of irregularity restatements on analyst behavior. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that restatements affect analyst behavior in forming judgements regarding subsequent earnings announcements.