Strategic Capacity Planning Problems in Revenue‐Sharing Joint Ventures
研究了固定比例收益共享合同下合资企业的战略产能投资问题，通过博弈论分析互补和替代资源两种情形，发现存在唯一强纳什均衡，并提出了高效公平的合同方案。
We study strategic capacity investment problems in joint ventures (JVs) with fixed‐rate revenue‐sharing contracts. We adopt a game‐theoretical approach to study two types of JVs depending on how individual resources determine the effective capacity of a JV. With complementary resources, the effective capacity of a JV is constrained by the most scarce resource. We show that multiple Nash equilibria could exist. Nevertheless, there exists a unique Strong Nash equilibrium. We show that there is an efficient and fair fixed‐rate revenue‐sharing contract which induces the system optimal outcome in the Strong Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, with substitutable a resource, the effective capacity of a JV is measured by aggregating individual contributions. We show that there does not exist a fixed‐rate revenue‐sharing contract that induces the system optimum. We quantify that the efficiency of a JV which decreases with the number of participants, the cost asymmetry and the cost margin of the JV. We propose provably‐good fixed‐rate revenue‐sharing contracts with performance guarantees. We also propose a simple modified contract to achieve the channel coordination. Finally, we fit our model with historical data to shed some insights on two JV examples in the motion picture industry.