Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search
研究了双向搜索且收益可转移的匹配市场，其中婚姻收益取决于结婚时的年龄，证明了均衡存在性并给出了正向分类匹配的充分条件。
This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with positive sorting by age include all strictly increasing functions and constant flow payoffs enjoyed for some finite period.