Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games
研究了在欺骗游戏中，当说谎有固定成本且人们在意形象时，均衡报告行为如何产生，解释了实验中观察到的报告分布模式，并分析了形象关切和固定成本对说谎范围的影响。
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.