Disclosure and Legal Advice
研究了律师给客户的法律建议如何影响证据披露和裁决结果，以及裁决者应如何据此分配举证责任。发现律师若遵循披露所有有利证据的策略，其建议对裁决无影响；但若可信地建议隐瞒有利证据或咨询成本高昂，则会影响结果，前者对社会不利，后者有利。
This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing the evidence, their advice is found to have no effect on adjudication if the lawyers follow the strategies of disclosing all favorable evidence. A lawyer's advice can influence the outcome in his client's favor, either if (s)he can credibly advise his client to suppress some favorable evidence or if legal advice is costly. The effect is socially undesirable in the former case, but it is desirable in the latter case. Our results provide a general perspective for understanding the role of private information and expert advice in disclosure.