Low Reserve Prices in Auctions*
研究了第二价格拍卖中，当竞拍者足够风险规避且价值相互依赖时，最优保留价会低于卖方自身价值，结果可能接近无保留价的绝对拍卖。
Abstract A standard result in auction theory is that a seller’s profit-maximising reserve price is no less than his own value for the good. In practice, however, reserve prices often appear to be less than sellers’ values. This article revisits the theory of optimal reserves in the context of second-price auctions. The main result is that an optimal reserve is less than the seller’s value if the bidders are sufficiently risk averse and if their values are sufficiently interdependent. The resulting outcome may approximate that of an auction without reserve, i.e., an absolute auction.