The Role of the Audit Committee in Their Oversight of Whistle-Blowing
研究了审计委员会质量（独立性、专业性和勤勉度）如何影响举报渠道选择和举报人遭报复的可能性，发现高质量审计委员会能减少外部举报和报复，并促进内部举报系统建设。
SUMMARY We examine the role of the audit committee in their oversight of whistle-blowing. Our study examines whether the quality of the audit committee, captured by its independence, expertise, and diligence, is associated with two whistle-blowing outcomes: the choice of reporting channel (external whistle-blowing versus internal reporting) and the likelihood of retaliation against the whistle-blower. Using a sample of internal and external whistle-blowing cases, we find that a high-quality audit committee reduces the probability that misconduct is reported externally relative to internally, and reduces the probability that a whistle-blower experiences retaliation. We further find that a higher-quality audit committee is associated with the implementation of a stronger internal whistle-blowing system, which in turn reduces the likelihood of external relative to internal reporting. Together, our findings suggest that a high-quality audit committee helps to ensure that whistle-blowing disclosures are received and resolved through internal channels.