Analysts' Influence on Managers' Guidance
研究发现，分析师在季度电话会议中要求管理层提供前瞻性信息（尤其是每股收益指引）后，管理层未来更可能提供类似指引；若分析师未询问，管理层则减少提供。这种影响长期存在，并延伸到盈余公告中。
ABSTRACT Analysts ask managers for forward-looking information in one-third of quarterly conference calls; most frequently, seeking earnings per share guidance. In this study, we examine the long-term consequences of analysts' questions on future manager disclosure choices. Using six types of commonly provided guidance, we find that when analysts request new guidance or ask about prior guidance, managers are more likely to provide similar guidance in future quarters. When analysts do not ask about prior guidance, managers are less likely to provide that type of guidance in the future. This effect is long-lasting, spills over into earnings announcements, and is strongest for firms with the most severe information problems. Our results provide evidence that analysts shape managers' disclosure choices in meaningful ways.