Is competition among cooperative banks a negative sum game?
研究了合作银行网络内部竞争对银行绩效的影响，发现内部竞争会损害网络功能，导致绩效下降，是一种负和博弈。
Abstract Does ‘inner competition’ – rivalry among network members – worsen performance in a network of cooperative banks? By weakening the functionality of the network, inner competition might, in fact, endanger network-dependent scale economies. Testing our hypothesis on Italy's network of mutual cooperative banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo – BCCs), we find a worsening of performance of both incumbents and (even more) aggressors when BCCs compete among themselves. However, the worsening is mild when BCCs compete with comparable non-mutual banks external to the BCC network. We conclude that inner competition among cooperative banks is a negative sum game and, thus, limiting it would be desirable to preserve the stability of cooperative banking networks.