Financing Efficiency of Securities-Based Crowdfunding
分析了早期创业项目从分散的、内生知情投资者处融资的过程，发现投资者不获取信息就出资的“失败者祝福”和获取信息后的“赢家诅咒”都会降低融资效率。
Abstract We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a “loser’s blessing” that encourages contributing without information. Making the offering less attractive to investors mitigates the loser’s blessing but can give rise to a winner’s curse. Both tensions reduce financing efficiency. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.