Capital Share Dynamics When Firms Insure Workers
研究发现美国企业总体资本份额上升但企业层面下降，原因是超级企业产出份额增加而劳动报酬未成比例增长；模型表明企业为工人保险、风险增加延迟退出并扩大超级企业规模，从而推高总体资本份额。
ABSTRACT Although the aggregate capital share of U.S. firms has increased, capital share at the firm‐level has decreased. This divergence is due to mega‐firms that produce a larger output share without a proportionate increase in labor compensation. We develop a model in which firms insure workers against firm‐specific shocks, with more productive firms allocating more rents to shareholders, while less productive firms endogenously exit. Increasing firm‐level risk delays exit and increases the measure of mega‐firms, raising (lowering) the aggregate (average) capital share. An increase in the level of rents magnifies this effect. We present evidence that supports this mechanism.