Related Party Transactions, Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation
研究2001-2012年间CEO与外部董事关联交易的变化，发现2006年SEC披露规则改革后，关联交易与CEO薪酬的正相关关系消失，支持了弱治理假说向有效契约假说的转变。
Abstract Examining the years 2001–2012, we document a decrease in reported CEO related party transactions (RPTs) and an increase in reported outside director RPTs, with the largest change occurring around the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) RPT disclosure changes. Our analysis of the determinants of RPTs and their association with CEO compensation also shows an impact of the SEC disclosure change, as we find support for the weak governance hypothesis in the pre‐2006 period and some support for the efficient contracting hypothesis post‐2005. While our results vary by model, pre‐2006, consistent with weak governance we find that outside director RPTs are positively associated with CEO compensation, with our estimates of the impact ranging from 8 to 18% depending on the model. In the post‐2005 period, this result dissipates, and we find some evidence consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis. Overall we find that the SEC RPT disclosure change appears to have had a significant impact on reported RPTs, the determinants of those RPTs, and the impact of those RPTs on CEO compensation.