Co-operation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty
研究了在有限自利个体的一次性社会困境中，通过让玩家不知道自己在行动序列中的位置但能观察部分前人行动，从而激励合作并实现完全合作。
Abstract We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Since agents realise that their own action may be observed, they have an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. The same environment leads to full co-operation in the prisoners’ dilemma.