Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences
研究在双边匹配中如何仅利用一方的偏好和相互可接受的配对来预测稳定匹配，并分析法国数学学术职位市场数据，发现约45%的职位和60%的候选人的匹配结果不依赖于被录用候选人的偏好。
In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side’s preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market.