Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China*
利用中国试点城市的监管改革作为自然实验，通过双重差分法发现，基于历史索赔和交通违规的保险定价激励可将索赔频率降低12%，但效果因驾驶员财富和索赔历史而异。
Abstract We contribute to the growing body of literature on moral hazard by offering empirical evidence of the effectiveness of insurance pricing incentives at improving road safety. We do this by comparing the claim frequency following a regulatory reform introduced in a pilot city in China, with the experience of another city unaffected by the reform. By using a difference‐in‐differences methodology, we find that improving insurance pricing on past claims and on traffic violations with full industry commitment reduces moral hazard and insured drivers’ claim frequency by 12 percent. The treatment effects are, however, heterogeneous with respect to insured drivers’ wealth and their history of past claims.