The New Closed Shop? The Economic and Structural Effects of Occupational Licensure
研究发现职业许可并未如传统观点所认为的那样限制竞争或提高工资，反而促进了职业进入，尤其是对历史上处于弱势的群体，但同时也导致了质量停滞。
During the past few decades, licensure, a state-enforced mechanism for regulating occupational entry, quickly became the most prevalent form of occupational closure. Broad consensus among researchers holds that licensure creates wage premiums by establishing economic monopolies. This article demonstrates that, contrary to established wisdom, licensure does not limit competition, nor does it increase wages. Results are based on a new occupational dataset, covering 30 years, that exploits interstate variability in licensure across the 300 census-identified occupations. I argue that licensure, instead of increasing wages, creates a set of institutional mechanisms that enhance entry into the occupation, particularly for historically disadvantaged groups, while simultaneously stagnating quality.