Inefficient rushes in auctions
研究了私有化、公开招标和收购中常见的一种情形：事后有效配置（即最优结果）无法实现。主要发现是公开增价拍卖容易发生抢跑（所有活跃竞拍者同时退出），从而损害效率；而两轮拍卖可以实现次优结果。
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule.