近视与远视参与者的匹配

Matching with myopic and farsighted players

Journal of Economic Theory · 2020
被引 34 · 同刊同年前 10%
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

提出成对近视-远视稳定集概念,研究同时存在近视和远视参与者的匹配稳定性,发现当所有参与者远视时稳定集仅含核心元素,而混合时核心外匹配也可能稳定。

Abstract

We introduce the new notion of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set to study stable matchings under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. For the special case where all players are myopic, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all players are farsighted, we provide the characterization of pairwise myopic-farsighted stable sets: a set of matchings is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set if and only if it is a singleton consisting of a core element. This result confirms the result obtained by Mauleon et al. (2011) with a completely different effectivity function and provides a new special case where the farsighted stable set is absolutely maximal (Ray and Vohra, 2019) and coincides with the Strong Rational Expectations Farsighted Stable Set (Dutta and Vohra, 2017). When myopic and farsighted players interact, matchings outside the core can be stable and the most farsighted side can achieve its optimal stable matching.

配对博弈近视与远视玩家成对近视-远视稳定集核心匹配