Thresholds, Perverse Incentives, and Preemptive Conservation of Endangered Species
研究了《濒危物种法》下私人土地的预防性保护激励，发现保护阈值高低和栖息地保护与破坏的相对成本决定了激励结构是促进保护还是导致破坏，对政策制定有重要启示。
Implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) on private land has historically focused on regulation after a species was officially listed. In recent years it has shifted toward offering pre-listing incentives to avoid listings and the costs and conflicts resulting from regulation. In this paper we take an initial step toward examining these pre-listing incentives. We allow the incentive structure, perverse incentives to destroy habitat or preemptive conservation, to be endogenously determined. We show that which incentive structure emerges depends on how high the conservation threshold is and on the relative costs of habitat conservation versus habitat destruction. It is critical to distinguish between these incentive structures because a policy that works in one setting does not necessarily work in the other. Our results shed light on policy decisions in several recent high-profile ESA cases.