Private Information and Price Regulation in the US Credit Card Market
研究了2009年CARD法案限制信用卡发卡机构基于新信息提高利率后，价格对风险信号的反应减弱、价格离散度下降，导致高风险和价格不敏感消费者价格下降，但市场其他部分价格上涨，超过30%最安全的次级借款人面临高于支付意愿的价格，最终平均交易价格下降，各信用评分消费者剩余增加，部分源于利润下降和法案的保险价值。
The 2009 CARD Act limited credit card lenders' ability to raise borrowers' interest rates on the basis of new information. Pricing became less responsive to public and private signals of borrowers' risk and demand characteristics, and price dispersion fell by one‐third. I estimate the efficiency and distributional effects of this shift toward more pooled pricing. Prices fell for high‐risk and price‐inelastic consumers, but prices rose elsewhere in the market and newly exceeded willingness to pay for over 30% of the safest subprime borrowers. On net, average traded prices fell and consumer surplus rose at all credit scores. Higher consumer surplus was partly driven by a fall in lender profits, and partly by the Act's insurance value to borrowers who could retain favorable pricing after adverse changes to their default risk. The relatively high level of pre‐CARD‐Act markups was crucial for realizing these surplus gains.