How Do Employers Use Compensation History? Evidence from a Field Experiment
通过一项实地实验，发现当雇主无法查看求职者的薪酬历史时，他们会评估更多求职者、更深入地评估，并倾向于评估和雇佣过去平均工资较低的工人，同时被雇佣的工人在薪资谈判中能争取到更好的条件。
We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 5% lower past average wages and hired workers with 13% lower past average wages. Conditional on bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves.