Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market
研究了日本租户保护政策导致房东无法预知租户租期，进而引发房屋空置、新建公寓集中租户以及公寓频繁重建等低效率问题，并指出固定期限合同可缓解信息不对称、提升效率。
Abstract In Japan, tenants are protected in the sense that owners must compensate them for evicting them against their will, while owners cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If owners cannot specify the term of a lease, social inefficiency emerges: (i) detached houses owned by individual households remain vacant for a certain period; (ii) alternatively, landlords’ newly constructed apartments, which are free from eviction risk, accommodate a large proportion of tenants; and (iii) the apartments are rebuilt frequently even though they remain viable. If a fixed‐term contract is available, only short‐term tenants choose it, and the information asymmetry is dissolved, realizing social efficiency.