Exchange‐Sponsored Analyst Coverage
研究了新加坡交易所赞助分析师覆盖计划的效果，发现赞助分析师预测准确性较低，且对信息环境和股票流动性的改善有限。
Abstract Several major stock exchanges, including the NASDAQ and NYSE Euronext, have recently embarked on schemes to sponsor and promote analyst coverage for firms listed on their exchanges. We evaluate the efficacy of one such scheme pioneered by the Singapore Exchange (SGX). We find that sponsored analysts produce forecasts with similar bias, but lower accuracy than those issued by analysts voluntarily following a firm. In analyses that control for self‐selection into the SGX Scheme, we find that sponsored firms enjoy at best minor improvements in their information environments and stock liquidity. Any benefits accruing from the scheme are insufficient to make sponsored firms fully comparable to those of firms with voluntary analyst following on the measured attributes.