Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
研究发现美国企业在反垄断执法加强后，会在财务披露中分享更多关于客户、合同和产品的细节信息，这些信息可能帮助同行在产品市场上隐性协调行动，并与未来盈利能力提升相关。
ABSTRACT We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.