Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility
探讨了在结构估计可转移效用匹配博弈时需做的建模决策，包括选择博弈论解概念（如成对稳定、竞争均衡、拍卖）以及处理连续或有限数量代理人等问题，对从事匹配市场实证研究的经济学者有参考价值。
Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.