Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching
研究了在策略防御的延迟接受算法中，参与者错误报告偏好如何影响好学生进入好学校的匹配效果，发现错误可能显著促进或阻碍匹配，进而影响福利。
Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for “nudges” that correct these mistakes.