Political budget cycles and divided government
研究德国市级层面分裂政府对政治预算周期的影响，发现行政与立法由同一政党控制时，支出和税率更易出现选举周期，分裂政府下政策操纵显著减少。
Political budget cycles and divided government. Regional Studies. This study empirically examines the effect of divided governments on the existence of political budget cycles. It uses a setting at the German municipality level, where divided governments occur frequently and can be clearly disentangled from the underlying political system. In this setting, the executive does not have full discretion over expenditures and tax rates, and needs support from the legislative to manipulate policy before executive elections. The study shows that political budget cycles in expenditures and tax rates are more likely when the same party controls executive and legislative. Under divided government, policy manipulation is significantly smaller.