Unstable Inflation Targets
研究了在不完全信息环境下，央行设定未充分沟通的通胀目标如何通过两个渠道导致预期偏离理性预期，并讨论了避免预期脱锚的政策含义。
This paper studies long‐run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inflation targets can lead agents' beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels. First, implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting. Second, there can be nearly self‐fulfilling inflation, disinflation, or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks. Policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed.