Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia
通过埃塞俄比亚的随机实验，比较审计威胁和道德劝说两种反逃税策略的效果，发现审计威胁更有效，尤其对高逃税嫌疑企业。
We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors.