Harmful, Harmless, and Beneficial Uncertainty in Law
研究了四种法律相关不确定性对风险中性行为人的影响，发现执法针对性强或制裁分级时不确定性有害，而监管预审批时不确定性有益，为法律标准具体性、公司刑事责任改革等政策辩论提供启示。
This article examines the impact of four types of law-related uncertainty on the utility of risk-neutral agents. We find that greater legal or factual uncertainty makes agents worse off if enforcement is targeted (which means that greater deviations from what the law demands lead to a greater probability of enforcement) or if sanctions are graduated (which means that greater deviations from what the law demands result in higher sanctions). In contrast, agents are indifferent to changes in uncertainty about detection induced by variation in enforcement resources or to changes in uncertainty about sanctions arising from legally irrelevant factors. Finally, risk-neutral agents benefit from greater legal uncertainty if they act only on preapproval by a cautious regulator. Our findings shed light on policy debates about the appropriate specificity of legal standards, the reform of corporate criminal liability, and the government’s reluctance to clarify the details of tax law and tax enforcement.