Financial Performance, CEO Compensation, and Large-Scale Information Technology Outsourcing Decisions
研究了1993-2001年间51家公司的数据，发现CEO股票期权和薪酬结构显著影响大规模IT外包决策，且公司业绩差、成本控制弱和短期现金需求也是驱动因素。
Abstract The inherent riskiness of large-scale information technology (IT) outsourcing led us to investigate what motivates large-scale IT outsourcing decisions. We employed fixed-effects logistical regressions to examine publicly available data for 51 firms that announced their decisions to outsource all or a large portion of their IT function during the 1993-2001 period. Results suggest that incentives created by CEO stock options and overall compensation mix significantly influence decisions to outsource. We thus provide the first evidence of a relationship between managerial self-interest and IT outsourcing. Additional results suggest that poor overall firm performance, poor cost control, and short-term cash needs also drive large-scale IT outsourcing, but provide no evidence that firms outsource IT to reduce leverage. Overall, we conclude that CEOs consider several personal and firm-level financial factors, including factors unrelated to IT cost and performance, when making large-scale IT outsourcing decisions. Our conclusion has numerous implications regarding long-term IT performance, long-term firm performance, CEO contracting and financial reporting. Keywords: CEO compensationincentive compensationinformation systems outsourcinginformation technology outsourcingstock options