所有权结构、制度组织与测度的X效率

Ownership Structure, Institutional Organization and Measured X-Efficiency

American Economic Review · 1992
被引 117
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

结合Harvey Leibenstein关于X效率的原始洞见,探讨所有权结构和制度组织如何影响测度的效率,对关注企业效率测度的学者有参考价值。

Abstract

Efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years, and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area.' In this paper, we relate these developments to Harvey Leibenstein's original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behavior. Of course, it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realize what it is that is being maximized. However, we shall evade this easy escape route into nonfalsifiable hypothesizing and instead shall take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics.

所有权结构制度组织X效率