Incentivizing Calculated Risk‐Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers
通过商业银行信贷员实验，研究绩效薪酬如何影响风险评估和贷款决策，发现高能激励增加筛选努力和盈利贷款，但递延薪酬和有限责任会削弱这一效果，且激励会扭曲信贷风险评估。
ABSTRACT We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.