Bounded Rationality and Robust Mechanism Design: An Axiomatic Approach
提出一种公理化方法，研究具有明显占优策略的机制为何优于仅有占优策略的机制。通过弱化主观期望效用理论，定义明显偏好，并引入明显纳什均衡，识别出比仅纳什均衡更稳健的机制。
We propose an axiomatic approach to study the superior performance of mechanisms with obviously dominant strategies to those with only dominant strategies. Guided by the psychological inability to reason state-by-state, we develop Obvious Preference as a weakening of Subjective Expected Utility Theory. We show that a strategy is an obviously dominant if and only if any Obvious Preference prefer it to any deviating strategy at any reachable information set. Applying the concept of Nash Equilibrium to Obvious Preference, we propose Obvious Nash Equilibrium to identify a set of mechanisms that are more robust than mechanisms with only Nash Equilibria.