An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change: The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients
分析安达信倒闭后其客户选择新审计师的因素，发现代理问题大的公司更可能断绝关系，而转换成本高的公司更可能跟随原审计团队；强制变更并未显著改善财务报告质量，对强制轮换辩论有启示。
This study examines former Arthur Andersen clients and provides evidence on the factors involved in their selection of new auditors after Andersen's collapse. Using a unique dataset that identifies whether former Andersen clients followed their audit team to a new auditor, findings reveal companies with greater agency concerns were more likely to sever ties with their former auditor, whereas those with greater switching costs were more likely to follow their former auditor. We also investigate the effect of the forced auditor change on financial statement quality in an effort to provide insight into the mandatory auditor rotation debate. Using performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for reporting quality, our results fail to reveal significant improvements for companies with extreme discretionary accruals that severed ties with Andersen, which is inconsistent with the notion that mandatory rotation improves financial reporting.