INCENTIVES FOR DISHONESTY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY WITH INTERNAL AUDITORS
通过实验发现，基于激励的薪酬（竞争性激励和集体激励）会增加内部审计师的不诚实行为，且从客观绩效评估转向同行评估会降低审计师绩效。
We conduct an experiment with professional internal auditors and evaluate their performance and objectivity, measured as the extent to which they truthfully report the performance of other participants in a real‐effort task. In line with our hypotheses, we find that incentive‐based compensation increases dishonest behavior: competitive incentives lead to under‐reporting of other participants' performance, while collective incentives lead to over‐reporting of performance. We replicate these results with a student sample. In addition, we find that moving from an environment with objective performance evaluation toward a peer evaluation scheme reduces performance among internal auditors, but not among students.