EFFICIENT LARGE‐SIZE COORDINATION VIA VOLUNTARY GROUP FORMATION: AN EXPERIMENT
实验研究在弱链接博弈中，通过允许退出和合并选项，大型群体如何自发形成高效协调，发现种子群体设定最大努力和信任规范，最终转化怀疑者并加速协调成功。
Efficient coordination in large groups is a fundamental issue in economic organizations. We consider the weak‐link game with the feature of economies of scale that is necessary for voluntary group growth, in a minimal setup with exit and merger options. We show that large groups with efficient outcomes prevail in most communities. Seed groups form that seem to set a norm of both maximal effort level and mutual trust that there will be no panic when seeing noisy dips. Initial doubters are eventually converted into norm abiders. A restart further speeds up the process of coordination success.