What makes prosecutors independent? Analysing the institutional determinants of prosecutorial independence
从政治经济学视角分析检察独立性的制度决定因素，发现新闻自由、议员豁免权和普通法传统与更高的实际独立性正相关，对研究司法改革和法治建设的学者有参考价值。
Abstract The prosecution of criminal suspects is an integral part of a country's justice system. While substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the police and judges and their relevance to the rule of law, surprisingly little is known about prosecutors. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards filling this knowledge gap. We first demonstrate the rising importance of prosecutors in criminal justice systems around the world. We identify the independence of prosecution agencies from the other two branches of government as a centrally important characteristic and then proceed to analyse the determinants of de facto prosecutorial independence from a political economy perspective. We find that press freedom, the immunity of parliamentarians and belonging to the common law tradition are positively associated with higher de facto independence.