Does high labour mobility always promote trade liberalization?
本文通过构建包含选举和部门调整的两期模型，发现劳动力流动性与贸易自由化程度之间存在非单调关系，在代议制民主中，高劳动力流动性有时反而阻碍贸易自由化。
Abstract Labour immobility (high adjustment cost) has been regarded as a major obstacle to trade liberalization and it has been argued that higher labour mobility promotes trade liberalization. However, this is not the case when we take into account conflicts of interest between politicians and voters that are inevitable in representative democracy. I construct a simple two‐period model including both elections and sectoral adjustment. Then I show that the non‐monotonic relationship between labour mobility and the equilibrium degree of trade liberalization exists due to the principal–agent relationship. In representative democracy, higher labour mobility prevents trade liberalization in some cases.