Panic bank runs
通过实验证明，即使银行基本面没问题、储户之间也没有协调失败，恐慌性挤兑仍会发生；储户看到别人取款就会跟风，并高估挤兑发生的概率，损失厌恶能预测这种行为。
We provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems with fundamentals and coordination failures among depositors, the two main culprits identified in the literature. Depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so, even when theoretically they should not. Our findings suggest that panic also manifests itself in the beliefs of depositors, who overestimate the probability that a bank run is underway. Loss-aversion has a predictive power on panic behavior, while risk or ambiguity aversion do not.